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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
Bt;ILD, INC., a Utah <__•orporation, )
Plain tiff and Responde ut,

-vs.-

No.10093

.JOTIX G. ITALASANO and THEO
IT.AL.A~AN<), his wife,
Defendants and Appellants,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
ST~\TE~IE~1,

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This i~ an action for a suin claimed to be due and
o\ring to thP plaintiff corporation for constructing a
hon1e for the defendants in Bountiful, Utah, and the defendants counterclailned alleging that they were damaged
by plaintiff~ failure to perform according to the terms
of a contract bet,veen the parties.
DISPOSITION I:t\ LOvVER__ COURT
The ra~t> \\·a~ tried to the court. Fro1n a judgn1ent
in favor of plaintiff in the an1ount of $3,483.44 together
\rith eo~ts, and no cause of action on the counterclai1n,
defendants appeal.
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RELIEF

s.o~UGHT

ON APPEAL

Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and judgInent in their favor, or that failing, a re-examination
of the case in equity and a balancing of the equities between the parties

STATEME.NT O·F FACTS
Plaintiff corporation, essentially a one-1nan corporation owned and controlled by one Richard J. Stromness,
a man with sixteen years' building experience (T. 3),
constructed a home for the defendants on their own lot
and foundation at 6393 South 4th East in Bountiful, Utah.
Work commenced in about June of 1959 and was completed about March of 19'60. It is the contention of plaintiff that there was a contract between the parties to build
the home and that it was of the "cost-plus" type, i.e., the
builder figures all his costs of building, then to this
figure he adds a percentage for overhead and an additional percentage for profit. (T. 37).
Defendants on the other hand maintain that the contract to build the home was for a sum not to exceed $15,000.00 in any event ( T. 125).
The agreen1ent and arrangements between the parties
to build the ho1ne were oral, and it is clear that plaintiff
neglected to enter into a written contract when defendants inquired of him about it, and in fact didn't desire
one (T. 160).
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TJu~ learned Trial {~ourt coneluded that to pffect sub-

stantial justieP bet\Vl'Pn the parties hE' would 1nake a
eontruct bPt\reen the1n in equity (R. 29). In doing so
thP <·ourt took th-.~ total a1nount for tnaterials and labor
as contained in plaintiff's accounting and deducted the
runount~ paid directly to suppliers by defendants and all
cash paytnents to plaintiff. This left the balance of
$3483.44 for which the court rendered judgment in favor
ofthP plaintiff (R. 29 and30).
In tnaking this contract between the parties, the
('Ourt took into account only the disbursements of the
plaintiff and didn't consider the additional disburseHlt1nts of the defendants on the home, and the appraisal
"rhi('h \vas n1ade at about the time of occupancy (R. 28-30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE EVIDENCE D·OES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO CQN·TRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES TO CONSTRU,CT A HOME FOR DEFENDANTS
FOR THE SUM OF $15,000.00 OR LESS, AND IT WAS ERROR
FOR THE COURT TO WRITE A CONTRAiCT F'OF THE
PARTIES.

rrhe difficulty of the parties here stems mainly from
their lack of a written contract 'vhich plaintiff delcined
to entPr into before 'vork began (T.160).
Plaintiff contends that the contract to build the
honte v;a~ of the ~'cost-plus" type, i.e., materials and labor
plus a 1narkup for overhead and profit (T. 37) while de-
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fendants contend that the agreen1ent 'vas to the effect
that the cost vlas not to exceed $15,000.00 and "yas to be
less, depending upon how much work ~Ir. Italasano and
his family could do ( T. 125).
We now examine the transcript to see which of these
two positions is sustained by the weight of the evidence.
John G. Italasano testified that from the beginning
of his discussion with Richard Stromness, president of
plaintiff corporation, he emphasized that he had only
$15,000.00-and his testimony is that Mr. Stromness
(after studying the plans and specifications to the home
for two months) said that the home could be built for
$15,000.00 ( T. 121).
It is true that defendant agreed to work himself,
but this was to effect savings below the $15,000.00 figure
('T. 122). It is also clear that Stromness knew that $15,000.00 was all that was available for the work since he
talked with defendant's employer who loaned defendants
the money to build the home (T. 122). The agreement was
clearly to the effect that the total expenditures by the defendant were not to exceed $15,000.00, and any saving
below that figure was to inure to the defendants. (T.125)
Plaintiff testified that in cost-plus work, a careful
record of the work done is kept and a periodic accounting
given to the owner (T. 5). Here no accounting was given
to the owner till after the home 'vas completed (T. 73),
although plaitiff told defendant when the job was twothirds complete that he was within the $15,000.00 figure
( T. 29').
4
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Plaintiff's expert on consrtuction contracts, ~{r.
Royal Atwood, didn't testify that this type of contract
i~ customary for residential construction (T. 45), and
had never heard of an entire building being constructed
with this type of contract
46). Cost-plus contracts
are usually only for a part of the whole job or to finish
work already provided for in a main contract (T·. 48).

er.

Defendants' witness, rrerrell F. Beddingfield, a construction foren1an for Skyline Construction 'Co., but
forn1erly with Build, Inc., the plaintiff, testified that in
the construction business, on cost-plus contracts, very
few 1naterials are shuttled from one job to another since
the bookkeeping then becomes very burdensome.
The following question was asked the witness:

Q. Is there a custom in the building and construction industry about shuttling materials
back and forth from project to project, on
these two different types of contracts (i.e.
cost-plus and.fixed amount) (T'.l17) ~
. A. fter n1uch objection and strenuous efforts on the
part of plaintiff's counsel to keep this evidence out of the
record, the \Vitness was allowed to answer:

A. To the best of 1uy knowledge, on cost-plus
work, material is 1noved as little as possible,
because of the bookkeeping involved to move
it. On jobs that I personally have run, and
been in a supervisory capacity over, every
item has to be accounted for. And this was
the reason it is not done in a cost-plus, any
n1ore than an absolute minimum (T. 118).

5
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But materials \Vere moved from one job site to another during the construction of the I talasano hotne
(T. 98, 197 and 198). The witness Bedingfield, \vho had
worked on the Italasano home, testified in response to a
question asking if he had seen an exchange of materials
between the Italasano project and St. Olaf's project:
A.

Oh, there was sheeting rnoved fron1 the Italasano home to the St. Olaf's, and vice versa.
Trim from St. Olaf's. And I believe there
was a door moved from St. Olaf's to the
Italasano home.

Q. Who authorized this 1
A.

Mr. Stromness

(T. 98)

Nowhere on plaintff's accounting (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) do we see these items mentioned. This hardly
shows a cost-plus contract-on the contrary, this evidence
strongly supports a fixed-sum type of contract. There is
more. The witness Beddingfield while examining the
plans and specifications for the Italasano hotne quotes
Mr. Stromness as saying that he had an offer to build
this home for $15,000.00. He then mentioned that l\ir.
Stromness discussed with him how to figure the cost of
3onstruction ( T. 95).
When the accounting in excess of $5,000.00 over the
agreed upon price was finally prepared, Stromness went
to his men and asked them to return this money for their
labor on the home. Beddingfield testified that he and
others \vho \vere present were informed that ". . . the
G
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labor costs had, in ~Ir. Strontness' opinion, exceeded the
agreed upon price, I assu1ned to be $15,000.00, and he
felt that it was strictly labor... ''. (T. 97). It appears
that when the plaintiff decided he hadn't come out on his
bargain, h(• tried first to get sotne of his money back
fro1n his Inen. When he was unsuccessful in this, he
tnrned to the defendants. It is very significant, however,
that he did not file a mechanic's lien. Mr. Stron1ness is a
licensed contractor; he is fan1i.liar with mechanic's liens
nnd their significance, but nevertheless, .he di~'t file one
(T. ~7). Why· didn't lie if his contract was cost-plus~ It
\Votdd appear that he would certainly file a lien if it were
propPr 'for hitn to do so. He is also aware that it is a
tnisdetneanor to falsely file a lien (see 38-1-25, Utah Code
A.nnotat'ed, 1953). · The failure of a licensed builder of
eonsiderable experience ·to file a lien doesn't show that
the contract here was cost~plus, rather it shows that there
was a fixed-sutn type of contract wherein plaintiff would
have had no recourse to the lien statutes.
'

I

The evidence clearly points to-- a contract for $15,000.00 or less. This is all the funds· at defendants' disposal and the plaintiff was aware of this ('T. 56 and 122).
Defendant's testimony is to the effect that this was their
agreement (T .. 125). ·Plaintiff's .contention that he was
to ~UP!Jly only technical and skilled serVices and that defendant~ \Vould do the actual work (T. 10) is not supported by the evidence. Among the first men sent to the
Italasano job when work commenced was an apprentice
carpenter (T. 94-96). Does this lend support to his
t~stimony of supplying only skilled and technical assistance t
e submit that it does not; ·on the contrary this

''T
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supports the contention of the defendants that there
was a fixed-sum agreement here. Furthermore plaintiff admitted that he authorized his men to 'vork long
hours in other than technical and skilled capacities from
the beginning (T. 76). This hardly substantiates his
contention that he had a cost-plus contract with the defendants.
In view of the evidence which clearly shows a contract for the construction of the home for $15,000.00 it
was improper for the Trial Court to find "That it \Va~
the understanding of the plaintiff that the plaintiff would
furnish his organization, *** and would hold the construction costs as nearly as possible to $15,000.00 but
that the plaintiff would be paid an amount equal to the
costs expended by him plus ten percent for supervision."
and that "It was the understanding of the defendants on
the other hand that with the labor and material furnished
by them the maximum cost to them \vas not to exceed
$15,000.00'' and it was error to award a judgment for
$3483.44 to the plaintiff by "makiug a contract between
the parties" (R. 29). Certainly the parties didn't embark
upon a project so great as constructing a house without
a contract! It is clear that the duty of the court is to
interpret that contract, not rewrite or make one for the
parties simply because the court feels it is necessary
to rewrite the contract to effect justice between the par·
ties. Competent parties are entilted to make their own
lawful contracts or contractual arrangements, and it is
not within the province or power of the court to alter,
revise, modify or rewrite a contract by construction or
to make a new or different contract for the parties be-
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eaust' Uu~ court ft·t~l:::; that justice would be served therPby. rrhe duty of the court is confined to the interpretation and enfore<•BlPnt of the one which they have made
for themselvPH. In this connection see the opinion of
this court in East jfill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake
City. 108 Utah :315, 159 P. 2d 863 (1945). The rule is
further :::;tated at 17 1\ c.,J .S. Contracts, Sec. 296 ( 3),
pages 96 and 97 as follows:

The eourt 1nay not rewrite thP contract
for the purpose of accomplishing that which,
in its opinion, 1nay appear proper, or, on general principles of abstract justice, or under the
rulP of liberal construction, 1nake for the partit·~ a contract which they did not make for
themselves, or 1nake for them a better contract
than they chose, or saw fit, to make for themselves, or remake a contract, under the guise
of construction, because it later appears that a
different agreement should have been consulntnated in the first instance, or in order to meet
special circumstances or contingencies against
which the parties have not protected themselves. (Emphasis added.)
Thi~

court has ruled in the case of Carlson vs. Hamilton. S Utah 2d 272, 332 P. 2d 989 ( 1958) that the court
may not rewrite contracts for the parties thereto, and
that the parties are entitled to enter into any contract
on their O\Vn terms-even if the resulting contract is
unrea~onable or may lead to hardship on one side. See
al~o the rasP of Cole vs. Pa'rker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.
~d 623 (1956) "~herein this court stated: "'ThP courts
cannot :-;upervise decisions Inade in the business "\Vorld
anrl grant relief \vhen the bargain proves improvident."

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is also clear that a court of equity may not rewrite the contract for the parties. The rule is set out
at 30 C. J. S., Equity, Sec. 63, page 411 as follows:
A court of equity cannot *CI"::II= :JI: make a contract
for the parties, 'nor vary the ~erms of the one
made, nor substitute another one therefor, nor
can it remedy a wrong by making in effect a
contract between the parties witp reference to
the subject matter.
POINT II.
THA'T EVEN IF T·HIS COURT CON·CLUDE~S THAT THE
FI:t{DINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 'T•O THE EFFECT THAT
THERE WAS N·O ACT'UAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
P ART'IES WAS PROPER, T'HE RULING O:f THE TRIAL
COURT AND THE GRAN'TING OF THE JUDGMENT FOR
$3,483.44 IS IMPROPER UNDER 'T·HE RULES OF EQUITY.

This court must review the evidence as ·well as the
law on the appeal of a case in equity from the District
Court. See Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Sec 9.
Therefore this appeal on the record from the District
-t~IS.
Court to tilowR: court amounts virtually to a trial de
novo. This position was clearly. enunciated in Jensen
vs. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034 (1929). in the following language :
This case is one in equity. In this jurisdiction
the binding effect of findings of the trial court
in law cases is different fron1 that in equity cases.
In the former, the findings, as a general rule,
are approved if there is sufficient competent Pvidence to support them, and ordinarily, are not
disturbed, unless it is Inanifest that they are so

10
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ch·arly against the weight of the evidence as to
indicate a n1isconception, or not a due consideration of it. In the latter, our duty and respon~i
bility in approving or disapproving findings when
challenged are n1ore comprehensive. In such
case, on an appeal and a review on questions of
both law and fact, the review in effect is a trial
dr novo on the record. (emphasis added)
Abo in the case of Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157,
:!H:! P. ~14 (1930) this court said at page 164, "(this
ease) being an action in equity, the parties, under our
Con~titution are entitled to our judgment, as well as
that of the Trial Court." See also the following cases
w·herein this Court has held that its review of a case
in equity is a trial de novo
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley vs. Salt Lake
l/'alley Sand & Gravel Co., et al, 96 Utah 359, 85
P. 2d 791 (1939-)
Sipherd vs. Sipherd, 83 Utah 245, 27 p·. 2d 801
(1933)
Wallick vs. Vance, 76 Utah 209,289 P.103 (1930)

Here the record as we have heretofore reviewed it
clearly sho\vs that Richard Stromness, president of
plaintiff corporation who acted for it during the entire
course of events which led to the difficulties of the
parties herein, and a man with sixteen years' building
Pxperience, 'vas certainly in a position to avert any loss
or in effect head off any difficulties with over spending
on this ho1ne. It was his responsibility to keep
the books and records of the work and expenditures.
By his own testimony it was his duty to give periodic,
accurate and detailed accountings to the defendants.
11
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This he failed to do even though he knew that the
defendants only had $15,000.00 to finance the building
of this hon1e (T.7). The record is also certain that he
didn't properly supervise and control his Inen and their
work and yet they continued to work and charge large
amounts of labor against the hoine-son1eti1nes even
some on Sundays or holidays, and even during a period
of at least one month when Stromness was out of town.
{T. 79).
There was no supervisor present on the job to direct
the work of the men (T. 96), and plaintiff didn't file
Inechanic's liens ( T. 87), but he did try and get some
of the money back that he had paid his men who had
worked without supervision (T. 97). Certainly it was
Mr. Stromness' duty to supervise his men and keep labor
costs in line-they were not working for Mr. Italasano
( T. 97). If there has been injury here, plaintiff is the
party who was in the better position to forsee the problem and to prevent the injury, and if he failed to do so,
he must bear any loss. As stated at 19 American Jurisprudence, Equity, Sec. 482, pages 334 and 335:
If their claims are not shown to be equal, the
decision should be against the party who has
the weaker or inferior equity; and this party
is the one who is sho,vn to have been in the
better position to avert the loss, injury, or
prejudice 'vhich now n1ust be borne by the
other. A determination of the issue is governed by the proof as to the relative knowledge
of the parties or their means respectively of
farseeing the dilemma 'vhich has co1ne into
existence. (emphasis added)

12
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lf the relative positions of the parties in equity are
Pttual, the partie~ ntust retnain in their respective positions as is borne out by the following language from the
:-;rune ~eetion set out immediately above:

One who institutes suit against another must be
prepared to sho"T a prior or superior equity in
hintself. If the equity of the one party is shown
to be equal to the equity of the other-that is if
one 'vas as well situated as the other to forsee
and prevent the prejudicial situation-the loss or
harm n1ust be borne by the party on whom it has
fallen.
Even assutning that both parties are "innocent," i.e.
ignorant of the harmful consequences of their acts, the
one connnitting the act or acts which caused the harm
ntust bear any loss in this connection. S·ee 19 A me ric an
Jurisprudence, Equity, Sec. 483, page 335, wherein the
follo,ving maxims are set forth:
Where one of two innocent parties must suffer,
he through whose agency the loss occurred must
bear it.
..:\.nd also:
\Yhere one of two parties, both guiltless of intentional wrong, must suffer a loss, the one on whose
conduct, act, or omission occasions the loss must
stand the consequences.
The district court in writing a contract in equity for
the parties looked only to the actual disbursement of
the plaintiff in determining what was equitable. The
appraisal of the home which was made on Aprilll, 1960
-almost immediately after occupancy - was not con-
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sidered by the court in arriving at itt; decision although
the appraisal was admitted into evidence as Defendants'
Exhibit 4. An examination of the appraisal in its entirety
reveals that the home in question had an appraised valuation before depreciation of $20,128.00 including the
garage, but not the lot.
The defendants' contributions to the value of the
home should certainly be taken into account in arriving
at a just and equitable balace of the equities between the
parties, if the court must write a contract for them. The
record shows that defendants had already placed the
footers and foundations which were worth at least $800.00
and perhaps as much as $1500.00 (T. 210), carpets and
drapes were $1700.00 ( T. 210), at least 1000 hours of the
defendant's own work which if figured at an ultraconservative $1.75 per hour would be worth $1750.00 (T. 136).
These items coupled with the fact that $15,800.00 (T. 131)
was paid out directly shows that the defendants contributed the sum of over $20,000.00 toward a home which is
valued at slightly over $20,000.00. If the judgment granted by the trial court in the amount of nearly $3500.00 is
allowed to stand, this means that defendants will be
placed in the position of losing at least $3500.00 while
plaintiff would be held relatively harmless. Wherein
lies the equity of the Trial Court's decision when such
a result follows~ If the court felt that the appraisal was
not accurate, the defendants stood ready to supply any
appraisal desired (T. 208).

14
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Tht· n'cord ~ho\\·s that thP~ .. parties had a contract
whPrein the plaintiff agrPl'd to construct a horne on the
tlt·fendant~, lot and foundation for a ~nun not to exceed
$15,000.00. The court's clear obligation is to enforce that
<·ontnu·t, and <'Prtainl~· not to rP\\?ritP the contract for
the partiP:-\. rrhP l'UlP!-1 Of equity do not permit the COUrt
to rP\rritP a <'ont rart or <·on~true one so that an inequity
rP~ults. EvPn if this eourt should deterrnine that the
di~tri<'t court acted vroperly in \vriting a contract for
thP partiP~ in equity, the value of the horne as indicated
hy thP apprai:-;al ~hould hP considered by this court in
arri,·ing at an Pqnitable solution of the parties' problems.
ThP judg1nent of the Trial'Conrt should be reversed
nnd judgrnent entered for the defendants.
Respectfully submitted,

S. MARK JOHNSON
Attorney for Defendants and
Appellants
170 West 4th South
Bountiful, Utah
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